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"Benevolent Neutrality" Toward Religion: Still an Elusive
Ideal After Board of Education of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet

In its interpretation of the two religion clauses of the First
Amendment, the United States Supreme Court has sought to balance
the dictates of each.1 Nearly fifty years ago, invoking the image of
a " 'wall of separation between church and State,' "' the Court found
that the Establishment Clause requires governmental neutrality
toward religion: "Neither a state nor the Federal Government...
can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one
religion over another."3 Shortly afterwards, however, the Court
acknowledged the deficiency of the "wall" metaphor by stressing the
governmental duty to accommodate religion, holding that under the
Free Exercise Clause the state "follows the best of our traditions"
when it "respects the religious nature of our people and accommodates the public service to their spiritual needs."4 Because it has
recognized an essential "play in the joints" between the mandates of
the two religion clauses, the Court has accepted the constitutional
propriety of a certain degree of interaction between government and
religion.' Consequently, the Court has renovated its church-state
imagery, replacing the "wall" with a "barrier" that is "blurred,
indistinct, and variable" depending on the nature and degree of
governmental involvement with religion in each case.6
To characterize the delicate and elusive balance between the First
Amendment principles of neutrality and accommodation, the Court
introduced the ideal of "benevolent neutrality."7 In Board of
Education of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, the Court examined the
constitutionality of a state statute that established a separate public
school district to provide secular special education services for
1. According to the religion clauses, referred to respectively as the Establishment
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. CONST. amend.
I.
2. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (quoting Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)); see also infra notes 105-10 and accompanying text.
3. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15; see also infra notes 105-10 and accompanying text.
4. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952).
5. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970).
6. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971); see also infra notes 111-21 and
accompanying text.
7. Walz, 397 U.S. at 669.
8. 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994).
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handicapped children of a village populated exclusively by members
of a single religious sect.' The Kiryas Joel Court cited "benevolent
neutrality" as a mechanism by which "the Constitution allows the
state to accommodate religious needs by alleviating special burdens."'10 However, the majority decided that the statute at issue in
Kiryas Joel violated the neutrality principle of the Establishment
Clause" and exceeded the degree of governmental accommodation
of religion allowed by the Free Exercise Clause. 2
This Note reviews the Court's development of the First Amendment neutrality and accommodation principles, examining the various
analytical schemes used by the Court to determine the constitutionality of government involvement with religion. 3 The Note gives
particular attention to the "Lemon test,"'4 the focal point of sharp
controversy among the Justices in recent years because of conflicting
assessments of its continued utility.' The Note then examines the
application of the neutrality and accommodation principles in the
Kiryas Joel decision.' The Note finds that while the Kiryas Joel
Court appeared to eschew a formal reliance upon the Lemon analysis,
the Court nonetheless employed the basic Lemon principles, refined
and refrained in new terminology. 7 Furthermore, the Note proposes
that the sharply divided Court and the divergent rationales offered by
the Justices concurring in the judgment stem more from the
anomalous nature of the effort at accommodation under review in
Kiryas Joel than from the ongoing controversy over the utility of the
Lemon test." Moreover, the Note suggests that while the majority
refused to find the elusive "benevolent neutrality" ideal in the Kiryas
Joel statute, it could have, as the dissent effectively argued." In fact,
the majority likely would have so held if the statute had been
generally applicable, requiring the state to establish a separate public

9. Id. at 2486.
10. Id. at 2492.
11. I& at 2484.
12. Id. at 2493.
13. See infra notes 104-82 and accompanying text.
14. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The three prongs of the Lemon test
require that a statute have a secular legislative purpose, have a primary effect that neither
hinders nor promotes religion, and not require excessive governmental entanglement with
religion. Id. at 612-13.
15. See infra notes 137-77 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 198-201 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 202-15 and accompanying text.

18. See infra notes 216-43 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 244-55 and accompanying text.
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school district for any similarly situated group.20 Finally, recognizing
that five Justices expressed in Kiryas Joel their readiness to reconsider
the Court's decisions in School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball"' and

Aguilar v. Felton,' the Note predicts that if the Court again encounters statutes similar to the ones overturned in those cases, it will

uphold them as examples of benevolent neutrality.'
Twenty years ago the Satmar Hasidim-sectarians who practice
a strict form of Judaism-purchased property in Monroe, New York,
and began relocating there from Brooklyn, where they had resided
since immigrating to the United States from eastern Europe after
World War I.24 To resolve a zoning dispute, the Satmars petitioned to form the Village of Kiryas Joel within the town, invoking a

right provided by New York's Village Law.26 Because non-Satmars
in the area objected to secession, the lines of the village were drawn
to include only Satmar-owned property.27 Incorporated in 1977, the
village now has a population of around 8,500.V
Satmar children are educated in private, sex-segregated religious
schools that do not offer the special education services to which handicapped children are entitled under state and federal law.29 From

1984 until 1985, the Monroe-Woodbury Central School District
provided such services at an annex to one of the Satmar schools;
however, in response to the United States Supreme Court's decisions
in Aguilar v. Felton30 and School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball,3

the district discontinued this program.32 The Kiryas Joel children
20. See infra notes 263-78 and accompanying text.
21. 473 U.S. 373 (1985); see also infra notes 160-66 and accompanying text.
22. 473 U.S. 402 (1985); see also infra notes 167-77 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 256-62, 279 and accompanying text.
24. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2485. For more information on the Satmar Hasidim, see
Nancy E. Roman, Hasidic Village in School Test Case TracesRoots to Ukraine, Holocaust,
WASH. TIMES, March 27, 1994, at A10.
25. Local zoning regulations prohibited Satmar practices such as subdividing singlefamily homes into multiple apartments to enable extended families to live together, and
housing schools and synagogues in the basements of buildings owned by the sect. Kiryas
Joel,114 S. Ct. at 2496 (citations omitted) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment).
26. Id. at 2485 (citing N.Y. VILLAGE LAW §§ 2-200 to 2-258 (McKinney 1973 & Supp.
1994)).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. (citing Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-85 (1988
& Supp. IV 1992); N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 4401-09 (McKinney 1981 & Supp. 1994)).
30. 473 U.S. 402 (1985); see also infra notes 167-77 and accompanying text.
31. 473 U.S. 373 (1985); see also infra notes 160-66 and accompanying text.
32. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2485.
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then could receive special education services only by attending the
neighboring public schools, an option rejected by most Satmar
parents.33 Citing " 'the panic, fear and trauma [the children]
suffered in leaving their own community and being with people whose
ways were so different,' " the parents sued to contest the closing of
the village program and the resulting public school placements.' 4
The state court found, however, that because the parents had
complained only of emotional trauma rather than treatment inconsistent with the sect's doctrine or practices, the parents had failed to
show a violation of their children's constitutional right to free exercise
of religion.35 Therefore, the public school-district36 was not required
to provide the Satmar children a separate school.
The Satmars then turned their attention to legislative solutions,
and in 1989 the New York legislature enacted a statute, Chapter 748,
declaring the Village of Kiryas Joel " 'a separate school district'"
with " 'all the powers and duties of a union free school district.' ,
All nonhandicapped Satmar children remained in their private schools
while the village's public district provided a special education program
for handicapped children, along with transportation, remedial
education, and health and welfare services for nonhandicapped
children.38 Neighboring public school districts sent handicapped
Hasidic children to the Kiryas Joel public school; in fact, two-thirds
of the forty-odd full-time students came from other districts. 39
Before the new district began operating, respondents challenged
the constitutionality of Chapter 748 in state court.4' The trial court
found that the statute failed all three prongs of the Lemon test and

33. Id.
34. Id. (quoting Board of Educ. v. Wieder, 527 N.E.2d 767, 770 (N.Y. 1988)).
35. Id. at 2485-86 (citing Wieder, 527 N.E.2d at 775).
36. Id.
37. 1989 N.Y. Laws, ch. 748.
38. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2486.
39. Id. The Kiryas Joel public school also provided part-time services for many
students who regularly attended religious schools. Id.
40. Id. The state court action was brought by the New York State School Boards
Association and by some of its. officials, including Louis Grumet, suing as both officers of
the Association and as individuals. However, because the New York Appellate Division
found that the Association and its officers had no standing to challenge Chapter 748, the
respondents appeared before the United States Supreme Court as "citizen-taxpayers." Id.
at 2486 n.2. When the action against the original defendants, the New York State
Education Department and several state officials, was discontinued by the parties'
stipulation, the Kiryas Joel Village School District was allowed to intervene as a party
defendant. Id. at 2486-87.
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thus was unconstitutional.4 ' The appellate division affirmed, finding
that the statute violated the second prong of the Lemon test: It had
the "primary effect" of advancing religion.42 The New York Court
of Appeals affirmed on this basis, holding that the statute created a
"symbolic union of church and state" because both the public school
population and the district's school board would be made up only of
Satmars.4s The United States Supreme Court also affirmed,'
finding that "fb]ecause this unusual act is tantamount to an allocation
of political power on a religious criterion and neither presupposes nor
requires governmental impartiality toward religion.... it violates the
prohibition against establishment."'4
In a plurality opinion, Justice Souter, joined by Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and Ginsburg, invoked the First Amendment requirement that the state remain neutral toward religion, "favoring
neither one religion over others nor religious adherents collectively
Justice Souter found that Chapter 748
over nonadherents."'
violated this neutrality principle by "delegating the State's
discretionary authority over public schools to a group defined by its
character as a religious community, in a legal and historical context
that gives no assurance that governmental power has been or win be
exercised neutrally."'47 As an "instructive comparison," Justice
Souter recalled Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc.,' in which the statute
at issue granted to religious groups a veto power over liquor license
applications.49 The Court struck down the statute because it
"brought about a' "fusion of governmental and religious functions"
by delegating 'important, discretionary governmental powers' to

41. Id. at 2487 (citing Grumet v. New York State Educ. Dep't, 579 N.Y.S.2d 1004
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992)). A statute rarely fails the secular purpose prong of the Lemon test,
but in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985), the Court struck down a state law providing
for a moment of silent prayer or meditation in public schools because it lacked a secular
purpose. Id at 56-59; see also infra notes 137-50 and accompanying text.
42. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2487 (citing Grumet v. Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel
Village Sch. Dist., 592 N.Y.S.2d 123, (N.Y. 1992)).
43. Id. (citing Grumet v. Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Sch. Dist., 618 N.E.2d 94
(1993)).
44. Id. at 2484.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 2487 (plurality opinion).
47. Id. at 2484.
48. 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
49. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2487-88 (plurality opinion).
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religious 50bodies, thus impermissibly entangling government and
religion.
In support of his conclusion that Chapter 748 gave a religious sect
exclusive control over a political subdivision,51 Justice Souter noted
the following facts: (1) The New York legislature knew that the
village was established to be exclusively Satmar and that it remained
so when the legislature passed Chapter 748; (2) establishing a new
village school district contradicted New York's statewide trend toward
large, consolidated systems; (3) the legislature employed a special act
to create the district rather than utilizing general laws designed to
accomplish school district reorganization; and (4) the legislature failed
to exercise available options that would not have implicated the
Establishment Clause.' Justice Souter concluded that these factors
identified Chapter 748 as "substantially equivalent to defining a
political subdivision and hence the qualification for its franchise by a
religious test, resulting in a purposeful and forbidden 'fusion of
governmental and religious functions.' 53
Writing for a majority formed by the addition of Justice
O'Connor, Justice Souter continued to stress the neutrality principle.'
Justice Souter noted that Chapter 748 was flawed by its
failure to ensure the neutral exercise of governmental power.55
Because Chapter 748 was not a "general law" providing equal
treatment for many eligible communities, as was the law under which
the village was formed, Justice Souter complained that "we have no
assurance that the next similarly situated group seeking a school
district of its own will receive one. 56 Justice Souter concluded that
because neither the statute itself nor its historical context contradicted
the finding that the benefits of Chapter 748 flowed only to a single
sect, Chapter 748 violated the Establishment Clause. 7

50.
(1982)
51.
52.
53.

Id. (plurality opinion) (quoting Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116,126-27
(quoting School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963)).
Ld. at 2488 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 2490 (plurality opinion).
Id. (plurality opinion) (quoting Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 126

(1982)).
54. Id. at 2491.

55. Id. Justice Souter noted that the statute examined in Larkin v. Grendel's Den,
Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982), was struck down because of the same defect. Kiryas Joel, 114
S. Ct. at 2491.
56. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2491.

57. I&. at 2492 (citing Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244-46 (1982)). Similarly,
Justice O'Connor found Chapter 748 unconstitutional because it isolated a single group
for special treatment, and because the nature of the legislative process and the
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Finally, Justice Souter took up the counter-theme of accommodation, acknowledging it to be essential to the "' "benevolent
neutrality" ' 1)58 through which "the Constitution allows the state to
accommodate religious needs by alleviating special burdens." 9
However, he insisted that Chapter 748 exceeded the limits of
permissible accommodation because "we have never hinted that an
otherwise unconstitutional delegation of political power to a religious
Justice
group could be saved as a religious accommodation."'
Souter argued, though, that the State could provide for the special
needs of the Satmars by alternative means such as programs based at
schools in the neighboring Monroe-Woodbury Central School District,
or even programs offered by the neighboring district but housed in a
neutral site near one of the village's religious schools.6

Such

schemes would be constitutional so long as they are "administered in
accordance with neutral principles that would not necessarily confine
special treatment to Satmars.' ' 6Z
Justice Kennedy wrote separately to emphasize that "[t]he real
vice of the school district.., is that New York created it by drawing
political boundaries on the basis of religion.""3 Arguing that some
accommodation of the Satmars was proper, Justice Kennedy noted
that the sect faced a legitimate burden, that the state's action to
relieve it did not increase the burden on non-Satmars, and that the
creation of the district did not favor the Satmars over other religious
However, Justice Kennedy agreed that the particular
groups.'
method the state employed to accomplish this permissible accommodation must be found unconstitutional because it "require[d] the
government to draw political or electoral boundaries," and "the
Establishment Clause forbids the government to use religion as a lineJustice Kennedy asserted that because the
drawing criterion."'

unavailability of judicial review made assurances of equal treatment in future decisions
impossible; however, Justice O'Connor qualified her position by acknowledging that "this
is a close question, because the Satmars may be the only group who currently need this
particular accommodation." Id at 2497-98 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
58. Id. at 2492 (quoting Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334
(1987) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970))).
59. Id.

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 2493.
Id. (citing Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 247-48 (1977)).
Id.
Id. at 2501 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 2502 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
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State knew that the boundaries of Kiryas Joel defined it as a religious
enclave, the State's use of these lines in establishing the school district
represented "explicit religious gerrymandering" in violation of the
Establishment Clause.'
In sharp contrast, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Thomas in a forceful dissent, praised the
actions of the New York legislature as an "admirably American
accommodation" of religion.67 Moreover, Justice Scalia affirmed the
legislature's chosen means-the establishment of a school district for
Kiryas Joel-as "a classic drawing of lines on the basis of communality of secular governmental desires, not communality of religion. '
Justice Scalia focused first on the educational mechanism by which the
New York legislature sought to accommodate the needs of the
handicapped Satmar children, a public facility through which the state
provided secular special education.69 Justice Scalia relied on two
recent cases, one in which the Court affirmed a public education
program that served students of the same religion and was housed at
a neutral site adjacent to a religious school,70 and another in which
the Court allowed public provision of special education services to a
Catholic student on site at a parochial school.71 Justice Scalia argued
that because the provision of public educational services to handicapped sectarian students in a separate public facility is no more
offensive to the First Amendment than the provision of such
programs on a neutral site adjacent to a religious school, or even on
the very premises of such a school, these precedents require that the
Court affirm the accommodation at issue in Kiryas Joel.72
Justice Scalia then turned his attention to the public school
district entrusted to the Satmar villagers by the New York legislature
through Chapter 748, responding to Justice Souter's two-pronged
argument against its constitutionality.73 Justice Scalia attacked
Justice Souter's first argument-that Chapter 748 offended the
Establishment Clause by delegating governmental authority to the

66. Id. at 2504 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
67. Id. at 2506 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 2511 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 2506 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
70. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 247-48 (1977)).
71. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct.
2462, 2469 (1993)).
72. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 2507-14 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Satmars-as a misreading of Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc.7 4 Justice
Scalia contended that in that case the Court rejected the delegation
of government authority to a religious institution, not to citizens who
happened to share a common religion.75 Justice Scalia cited instances of religious groups establishing political communities to support
his conclusion that impermissible governmental favors to religious
institutions are different from permissible governmental benefits
76
conferred upon political entities that are religiously homogeneous.
Justice Scalia also rejected Justice Souter's second
argument-that the state's creation of the district was unconstitutional
because it was intended to favor the Satmars over other groups. 7
He concluded that there was no direct evidence that the legislature
intended to disadvantage or benefit the Satmars "because of their
religion. ' 78 To Justice Souter's intimation that the State drew the
district's boundaries intentionally on the basis of religion, 9 Justice
Scalia responded that the school district was created for the secular
purpose of meeting the educational needs of the handicapped children
of Kiryas Joel, and that the selection of the existing village boundaries
for the school district was reasonable and consistent with this secular
purpose." Acknowledging that the drawing of the village boundaries resulted in exclusion of non-Satmars, Justice Scalia pointed out
that all non-Satmars who were excluded from the village when it was
formed chose to be excluded because they did not favor the Satmars'
rezoning plan to permit high-density housing where formerly only
single-family homes had been allowed." Justice Scalia concluded by
chiding Justice Souter for doubting the integrity of the New York
legislature and for unreasonably demanding "up front" assurances of
2
neutrality.Y

74. 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
75. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2507 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
76. Id. at 2507-08 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
77. Id. at 2489-90 (plurality opinion).
78. Id. at 2508-10 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
79. Id. at 2490 (plurality opinion).
80. I& at 2511 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
81. Id. (Scalia J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 2512-13 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Souter portrayed Justice Scalia's
dissent as "the work of a gladiator" who "thrusts at lions of his own imagining." Id at
2493 (citing BENJAMIN CARDOZO, LAW AND LrrERATURE 34 (1931)). Responding to
Justice Scalia's argument that Chapter 748, with no regard to religion, simply granted
political power to a group that happened to be religiously homogeneous, Justice Souter
reiterated his perception that the school district's lines were drawn with the intention of
separating Satmars from non-Satmars. Id. at 2493-94. Answering Justice Scalia's charge
that the majority harbored groundless and unfair suspicions about the motives of the New
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As three Justices noted in Kiryas Joel, the Lemon test' was
conspicuously absent from the majority and dissent's analysis of the
constitutionality of Chapter 748. Justice O'Connor applauded the
Court's avoidance of the rigid Lemon test. She reported that omitting
the Lemon analysis was consistent with the Court's recent tendency
to develop and apply more precise case-specific tests, citing Lee v.
Weisman,' Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District,85 and the
case most similar, in her opinion, to Kiryas Joel, Larson v. Valente,86
as illustrative of the movement away from the Lemon test.'
In contrast, Justice Blackmun wrote separately to argue specifically that the lack of explicit reliance on the Lemon test in the opinion
of the Kiryas Joel majority did not signify the Court's departure from
the analytical principles embodied in the Lemon test.88 Noting that
the majority and plurality opinions relied on several prior holdings
that themselves rested on the Lemon criteria-most significantly
Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc.89 -Justice Blackmun reasoned that
Kiryas Joel was actually decided on the basis of the second and third
prongs of the Lemon test; only the terminology changed." For
example, a " 'fusion of governmental and religious functions' "
implicates the entanglement prong of the Lemon test, and the "lack
of any 'effective means of guaranteeing' that governmental power will
be neutrally employed" implicates the "principle or primary effect"
prong of the Lemon test.9
Justice Scalia noted that while the Kiryas Joel Court snubbed the
Lemon test, it figured prominently in the decisions of the courts

York legislature, Justice Souter insisted that "we simply refuse to ignore that the method
it chose is one that aids a particular religious community.... ." Id. Finally, to justify the
requirement of "up front" assurances of neutrality in application of Chapter 748 against
Justice Scalia's attack, Justice Souter criticized Justice Scalia's approach as shortsighted:
[Ujnder the dissent's theory, if New York were to pass a law providing school
buses only for children attending Christian day schools, we would be constrained
to uphold the statute against Establishment Clause attack until faced by a request
from a nonChristian family for equal treatment under the patently unequal law.
Id. at 2494 (citing id. at 2513-14 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
83. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
84. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
85. 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993).
86. 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
87. KiryasJoel, 114 S. Ct. at 2498-500 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment).
88. Id. at 2494 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
89. 459 U.S. 116 (1982); see also infra notes 129-36 and accompanying text.
90. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2494-95 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
91. Id. at 2495 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Larkin, 459 U.S. at 125-27).
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below and in the briefing of the parties.' Accusing the Court of
perpetuating confusion concerning the Lemon test, Justice Scalia
criticized the Court for failing once again in Kiryas Joel to decide the
future relevance of the Lemon test for the benefit of those who are
obligated to follow the Court's precedent.93 Justice Scalia disapproved of Justice O'Connor's suggestion that the Court replace
Lemon with what he characterized as nothing more than "a series of
situation-specific rules;"'94 however, Justice Scalia proposed no
alternative of his own to the Lemon test and appeared to express
unwillingness to abandon the test without a worthy alternative.95
Several Justices proposed remedies for the problem posed by the
special circumstances in the Village of Kiryas Joel. For instance,
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Blackmun and Ginsburg, suggested
that instead of taking an action that "affirmatively supports a religious
sect's interest in segregating itself and preventing its children from
associating with their neighbors," the state should have taken
measures to alleviate the children's "panic, fear and trauma" by
"promoting diversity and understanding in the public schools."9 6
Justice O'Connor suggested that Chapter 748 could be cured of
Establishment Clause conflicts if the state redrafted it as an act of
generally applicable legislation. 7 She added that a second solution
would become available if the Court would, as it should, "reconsider
Aguilar, in order to bring our Establishment Clause jurisprudence
back to what ... is the proper track-government impartiality, not

animosity, towards religion."9" Justice Kennedy agreed, reasoning
that Chapter 748 would not have been deemed necessary but for the
Court's decisions in Aguilar v. Felton" and School District of Grand
Rapids v. Ball," which "may have been erroneous" and may
deserve reconsideration.' Finally, Justice Scalia would have solved

92. Id. at 2515 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
93. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
94. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
95. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 2495 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
97. Id. at 2498 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
98. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
99. 473 U.S. 402 (1985); see infra notes 167-77 and accompanying text.
100. 473 U.S. 373 (1985); see infra notes 160-66 and accompanying text.
concurring in the judgment). Justice
101. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2505 (Kennedy, J.,
Kennedy noted that in Aguilar and Ball the Court struck down programs providing public
education services on the premises of parochial schools, and in response to these decisions
the Monroe-Woodbury Central School District discontinued similar programs at annexes
to the parochial schools of Kiryas Joel. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
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the problem in Kiryas Joel simply by upholding Chapter 748 as a
permissible religious accommodation."m Moreover, he agreed that
Aguilar and Ball "should be overruled at the earliest opportunity"
because these decisions are "so hostile to our national tradition of
accommodation."''
Throughout the half-century prior to Kiryas Joel, the Court
struggled to balance the two constitutional dictates embodied in the
religion clauses of the First Amendment."° Beginning with Everson
v. Board of Education,0 5 the Court distilled these requirements of
the religion clauses into the twin principles of neutrality and accommodation." 6 At issue in Everson was the constitutionality of a state
statute that authorized reimbursement of public bus fares to the

The difficulties encountered by Satmar children subsequently sent to Monroe-Woodbury
schools precipitated efforts by the New York legislature to establish a school district for
the village. Id.(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). Admittedly troubled by these
events, Justice Kennedy intimated that, contrary to the Aguilar and Ball holdings, "sound
elaboration of constitutional doctrine" should embrace a scheme whereby neutral aid is
provided to both religious and nonreligious citizens so that problems such as those faced
by the handicapped children of Kiryas Joel could be addressed without the requirement
of special religious accommodations. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
102. Id. at 2506 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 2515 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
104. Commentators have proposed an array of solutions to the apparent conflict
between the two religion clauses, according to which the state must prevent the
establishment of religion while also allowing free religious expression. See, e.g., Jesse H.
Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U.
PrIT. L. REv. 673,675 (1980) (proposing as a reconciling principle that "the Establishment
Clause should forbid only government action whose purpose is solely religious and that
is likely to impair religious freedom by coercing, compromising, or influencing religious
beliefs"); Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads,59 U. CHI.L. REV.
115, 117 (1992) (harmonizing the religion clauses by asserting that their complementary
purpose "is to foster a regime of religious pluralism, as distinguished from both
majoritarianism and secularism"); Jonathan E. Neuchterlein, Note, The Free Exercise
Boundaries of PermissibleAccommodation under the Establishment Clause, 99 YALE L.J.
1127, 1146 (1990) (positing that "the free exercise principle defines the limits of the antiestablishment principle").
105. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
106. For an historical review of the Court's balancing of neutrality ("separation") and
accommodation from Everson forward, see Kenneth F. Mott, The Supreme Court and the
Establishment Clause: From Separation to Accommodation and Beyond, 14 J.L. & EDUC.
111, 112-45 (1985). For differing views regarding which principle should predominate in
the Court's analysis, compare LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 148, at 1201 (2d ed. 1988) (arguing that accommodation should prevail when the principles
of the religion clauses conflict, because "[s]uch dominance is the natural result of tolerating
religion as broadly as possible rather than thwarting at all costs even the faintest
appearance of establishment") with Daan Braveman, The Establishment Clause and the
Course of Religious Neutrality, 45 MD. L. REV. 352, 352-53 (1986) (contending that
"scrupulous neutrality" is the proper course for the Court in Establishment Clause cases).
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parents of Catholic school students who used public transportation to
travel to and from school. 7 The Court held that while the Establishment Clause prohibits the state from contributing tax dollars to
support a religious institution, the Free Exercise Clause forbids the
state to exclude anyone, "because of their faith, or lack of it, from
receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation."'"3 8 Because the
use of tax dollars for the benefit of parochial students was, in this
case, part of a public welfare program that granted the same provision
to students in both public and sectarian schools, the Court found no
constitutional violation."° Pointing toward the emerging principles
of neutrality and accommodation, the Court concluded: "[The First]
Amendment requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with
groups of religious believers and nonbelievers; it does not require the
state to be their adversary. State power is no more to be used so as
to handicap religions than it is to favor them.""'
In Lemon v. Kurtzman,"' the Court consolidated the various
tests for neutrality it had developed in previous cases"' and

107. Everson, 330 U.S. at 3.
108. Id at 16.
109. Id. at 17.
110. Id. at 18.
111. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
112. In School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), the Court
set forth the following test: "[W]hat are the purpose and the primary effect of the
enactment? If either is the advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment
exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution." Id. at 222.
Prior to Abington, the Court used "purpose" and "effect" to examine state actions for
neutrality toward religion. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 489-90 (1961). In Walz v.
Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), the Court examined the purpose and effect of the
governmental action at issue. Id. at 669-72. However, the Court supplemented the effect
test with an assessment of the resultant "degree" of government involvement with religion
to ensure that "the end result-the effect-is not excessive government entanglement with
religion." Id. at 674. Anticipating, ironically, what would later become a familiar critique
of the Lemon test-that the diverse array of First Amendment cases involving religion are
not amenable to analysis by any broad unifying principles-the Walz Court reasoned that
"[t]he considerable internal inconsistency in the opinions of the Court derives from what,
in retrospect, may have been too sweeping utterances oni aspects of these clauses that
seemed clear in relation to the particular cases but have limited meaning as general
principles." Id. at 668. Writing separately in Walz, Justice Harlan noted that testing for
neutrality of purpose and effect also calls for "an equal protection mode of analysis" by
which the Court may identify and strike down "religious gerrymanders" if it finds that the
entire class covered by the legislation is not significantly broader than the religious groups
or institutions to which the legislation applies. Id at 696 (Harlan, J., concurring). The
Court subsequently adopted Justice Harlan's breadth of coverage test in Gillette v. United
States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971), finding no religious gerrymandering because the conscientious
objector statute under review was "tailored broadly enough that it reflects valid secular
purposes." Id at 454.
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fashioned the three prongs of what became known as the Lemon test:
"First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its
principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor
inhibits religion... ; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive
government entanglement with religion.' ""' Utilizing the new test,
the Lemon Court examined statutes providing state funding for
nonpublic schools to facilitate secular education through reimbursement of expenses for salaries, books, and materials, or through
salary supplements granted directly to teachers of secular subjects in
nonpublic schools."' In the Court's analysis, these statutes passed
the secular purpose test because "they [were] intended to enhance the
quality of the secular education in all schools covered by the
compulsory attendance laws."" 5
The Lemon Court measured the level of entanglement by three
considerations: "the character and purposes of the institutions that
are benefitted, the nature of the aid that the State provides, and the
resulting relationship between the government and the religious
authority.""16 In light of these considerations, the Court found that
the state aid at issue in Lemon required impermissible, excessive
entanglement in at least four ways." 7 First, the special religious
character of the schools presented the potential for excessive
entanglement." 8
Second, direct funding of teachers' salaries
entailed exceptional governmental involvement, not only in the
financial affairs of recipient schools, but also in the daily educational

113. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13 (citation omitted) (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. 664 at 674).
In the voluminous negative commentary on the Lemon test, no aspect of it has escaped
sharp criticism. See, e.g., Choper, supra note 104, at 680 (claiming the entanglement prong
has created "conceptual chaos" and improperly discourages legitimate government
involvement with religion); Patricia M. Lines, The EntanglementProngof the Establishment
Clause and the Needy Child in the PrivateSchool: Is DistributiveJustice Possible?, 17 J.L.
& EDUC. 1, 16 (1988) (condemning the Lemon test for failing to yield predictable

outcomes and facilitate distributive justice); Michael S. Paulsen, Lemon Is Dead, 43 CASE
W. RES. L. REv. 795 passim (1993) (offering a thorough critique of each prong of the
Lemon test); William B. Peterson, "A PictureHeld Us Captive" ConceptualConfusion

and the Lemon Test, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1827, 1830-49 (1989) (arguing for elimination of
the purpose test because of difficulties in ascertaining purpose).
114. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 606-07.
115. Id. at 613-14. The Court briefly discussed application to the statutes of the
principal or primary effect prong, noting that compliance was a close question; however,
the Court declined to decide that question because it found that the statutes failed the
entanglement test. Id.
116. Id. at 615.
117. Id. at 616.
118. Id.
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operations of each school." 9 Third, the elaborate, ongoing state
monitoring required by the nature of the aid resulted in excessive
entanglement. 20 Finally, the Court noted that hotly contested
statutes such as the ones in Lemon inherently lead to excessive
entanglement because the perennial need for yearly appropriations
and the probability of ever-increasing demands consistent with
growing costs and populations will combine to aggravate political
divisiveness
and generate extraordinary religiously motivated political
2
activity.1 1
In Larson v. Valente," the Court limited the applicability of
the Lemon test and employed a strict scrutiny analysis. At issue in
Larson was a state statute subjecting to special registration and
reporting procedures only those religious organizations that received
The Larson Court
over half their funding from nonmembers.'
found the Lemon test inapplicable to such a measure because it is
"intended to apply to laws affording a uniform benefit to all religions,
and not to provisions.., that discriminate among religions."' 24 The
Larson Court reasoned that when it examines the constitutionality of
a governmental action favoring one religious denomination over
another, it deems the measure suspect and strikes it down unless it is
narrowly tailored to further a compelling government interest."
Applying this strict scrutiny to the statute at issue in Larson, the
Court acknowledged that the state had a significant interest in
protecting the public from abusive charitable solicitations, but ruled
that the statute was not narrowly tailored to further that interest. 26
The Court rejected as unsubstantiated the state's argument that
religious groups which receive more than fifty percent of their
contributions from nonmembers are less fiscally responsible than
other religious groups," 7 and concluded that the statute was so
blatantly designed to favor certain denominations while burdening

119. Id. at 616-19. The Court distinguished the direct funding of teachers' salaries in
this case from the provision of transportation services, see Everson v. Board of Educ., 330
U.S. 1, 17 (1947), or secular textbooks, see Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248
(1968).
120. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619.
121. Id. at 622-23.
122. 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
123. Id. at 230.
124. Id. at 252.
125. Id. at 247.
126. Id. at 251.
127. Id. at 248-49.
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others that the state was vulnerable to the charge of " 'religious
gerrymandering.' "12

Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc.," 9 by contrast, exemplified the
Court's frequent thorough application of the Lemon test. The Larkin
Court examined a state law empowering the decision-making bodies
of churches and schools to veto the licensing of liquor sales within 500
feet of their facilities,3 ' and found it unconstitutional for "vesting
discretionary governmental powers in religious bodies" in violation of
the First Amendment mandate of governmental neutrality toward
religion.'
Applying the Lemon test, the Larkin Court first
reasoned that, while the statute had in view valid secular purposes,
those could have been realized by other means, such as a total ban on
alcohol sales within reasonable distances of churches, schools and
similarly sensitive institutions.' Next, the Larkin Court determined
that the statute violated the primary effect test in two respects: First,
it failed to ensure that churches would make only religiously neutral
use of the political power entrusted to them; 33 and second, it
presented the "appearance of a joint exercise of legislative authority
by Church and State," thus providing "a significant symbolic benefit
to religion."'"
Finally, the Larkin Court found that the statute
violated the entanglement prong of the Lemon test because the
statute, by delegating political power to churches, effected a" 'fusion
of governmental and religious functions' ,135 that created the
potential for" '[p]olitical fragmentation and divisiveness on religious
lines.' ,,136

Wallace v. Jaffree'37 heralded a transformation in the Court's
analysis of legislation implicating the religion clauses. Although the
majority explicitly employed the Lemon test, 38 the analysis focused

128. Id. at 255 (citing Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 452 (1971)). The Larson
Court also concluded that the statute at issue would have failed the "primary effect" and
"entanglement" prongs of the Lemon test, had the Court applied them. Id. at 252-55.
129. 459 U.S. 116 (1982). The Court decided Larkin and Larson in the same year.
130. ad at 117.
131. Id. at 123.
132. Id. at 123-24.
133. Id. at 125.
134. Id. at 125-26.
135. Id. at 126 (quoting School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
222 (1963), and citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664,674-75 (1970); Everson v. Board
of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-13 (1947)).
136. Id. at 127 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 623 (1971)).
137. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
138. Id. at 55-56.
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almost exclusively on Lemon's secular purpose and primary effect

prongs, combining and refraining them as a new "endorsement"
test. 39 The Wallace Court struck down as unconstitutional a state
law providing for a moment of silence for" 'meditation or voluntary
prayer' " in public schools'" because the statute had no secular
purpose. 14'

The Court found the statute's purpose to be wholly

religious because the statute added the phrase "or voluntary prayer"
to an earlier version that mentioned only "meditation" as the purpose
of the moment of silence.'4 z

Moreover, the declared legislative

intent behind this revision was "to return prayer to the public
schools.' ' 143 Therefore, the Court reasoned that through this
statutory effort "to characterize prayer as a favored practice," the
State had endorsed religion.144

Justice O'Connor wrote separately in Wallace, in part to
elaborate her understanding of how the endorsement test gives
"analytical content" to the Lemon test.' 45
Although Justice
O'Connor was not prepared to abandon the Lemon test
completely,14 she urged that it be "reexamined and refined,"
characterizing her "endorsement test" as one such refinement.' 47

139. Id. at 56-61. Thus the majority opinion echoed the "endorsement" language used
by Justice O'Connor a year prior to Wallace v. Jaffree to explicate the Lemon test: " 'The
purpose prong of the Lemon test asks whether government's actual purpose is to endorse
or disapprove of religion. The effect prong asks whether, irrespective of government's
actual purpose, the practice under review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or
disapproval.' " Id. at 56 n.42 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring)). For commentary explicating and affirming the endorsement
test, see Donald L. Beschle, The Conservative as Libera" The Religion Clauses, Liberal
Neutrality, and the Approach of Justice O'Connor,62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 151, 175-90
(1987); Christopher S. Nesbit, Note, County of Allegheny v. ACLU: Justice O'Connor's
Endorsement Test, 68 N.C. L. REv. 590, 598-612 (1990).
140. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 41-42.
141. Id. at 57.
142. Id at 58-59.
143. Id. at 59.
144. Id. at 60.
145. Id. at 69 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
concurring in the judgment). Justice Rehnquist argued
146. Id. at 68-70 (O'Connor, J.,
vigorously in dissent for abolishing the Lemon test along with the Court's entire
Establishment Clause analysis from Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947), forward.
Wallace, 472 U.S. at 91-114 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Powell offered a brief
explication of the Lemon test "to respond to criticism" of it, noting that it has been neither
overruled nor modified, and warning that "continued criticism of it could encourage other
courts to feel free to decide Establishment Clause cases on an ad hoc basis." Id. at 63-64
(Powell, J., concurring).
147. 472 U.S. at 68-69 (O'Connor, J.,concurring in the judgment) (citing Lynch v.
concurring)). Justice O'Connor also
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-89 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
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For Justice O'Connor, the endorsement test gives "analytic content"
to the Lemon test's consideration of secular purpose and primary
effect by "requir[ing] courts to examine whether government's
purpose is to endorse religion and whether the statute actually
conveys a message of endorsement."'"
To this end, the endorsement test entails two inquiries: first, a review of the legislative
purpose behind the statute to determine whether government intends
through it to "convey a message of endorsement or disapproval of
religion"; 149 and second, a consideration of the effect of the measure
to determine whether an objective observer would perceive it as an
5
act of either endorsement or disapproval of religion.Y
In Allegheny County v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU," the Court
once again employed the Lemon test-now refined by incorporation
of endorsement analysis into the purpose and effect prongs-to strike
down a government-sponsored Christmas creche for impermissibly
endorsing religion." 2 However, the Court did uphold a display
including a Christmas tree, a menorah, and a sign celebrating liberty,
because of its religiously pluralistic and purely secular aspects."5
Although acknowledging that it formerly used the terms "favoritism"
and "promotion" as it now used "endorsement"-to express its
concern over whether the purpose or effect of a governmental action

criticized the role of the neutrality concept in Lemon analysis, arguing that the Court's
inconsistent and imprecise appeals for "government 'neutrality' toward religion" have
"exacerbated the conflict" between the two religion clauses. Id. at 82-83 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment). As a more realistic alternative approach, Justice O'Connor
proposed an " 'accommodation' analysis," contending that "[t]he solution to the conflict
between the Religion Clauses lies not in 'neutrality,' but rather in identifying workable
limits to the government's license to promote the free exercise of religion." Id. at 83
(O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
148. IL at 69 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
149. Id.at 74 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
150. Id.
at 76 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment). Justice O'Connor's view that
the "objective observer" perspective is the appropriate one from which to assess
endorsement is disputed in James M. Lewis & Michael L. Vild, Note, A Controversial
Twist of Lemon: The Endorsement Test as the New Establishment Clause Standard, 65
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 671, 688-94 (1990), according to whom "the genuine objection of
any reasonable observer [should] constitute a prima facie case of establishment clause
violation." Id.at 694. More severe is the critique of Steven D. Smith in Symbols,
Perceptions,and DoctrinalIllusions: EstablishmentNeutrality and the "No Endorsement"
Test, 86 MICH. L. REv. 266,267-68 (1987), who rejects the endorsement test as flawed by
its reliance on interpretation of symbolism and its assessment of perceptions which render
it unpredictable and inconsistent in application. Id. at 331.
151. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
152. Id. at 578-79.
153. Id.
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endorses religion'"--the Court articulated the "essential principle"
common to these concepts: "The Establishment Clause, at the very

least, prohibits government from appearing to take a position on
questions of religious belief or from 'making adherence to a religion

relevant in any way to a person's standing in the political community.'

,155

Writing on behalf of the Allegheny County dissenters, Justice
Kennedy reaffirmed the classic Lemon test, with some reservation,'56 and rejected the majority's incorporation of the endorsement
test into the Lemon framework.'57

Justice Kennedy decried the

endorsement test, finding it flawed because it would invalidate many
traditional practices in which government historically has affirmed the
role of religion, such as presidential Thanksgiving Day proclamations,
the Court's own opening prayer, legislative chaplains, and the national
motto "In God we trust."' 8 He also found it impracticable because
it "embraces a jurisprudence of minutiae," as evidenced by the

Allegheny County majority's application of it to evaluate the various
features of the holiday displays at issue.'59
154. Id. at 590-92 (citing Engel v. Vitale, 320 U.S. 421, 436 (1962)).
155. Id. at 593-94 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)).
156. Id. at 655-56 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and White joined Justice Kennedy's
dissent.
157. Id. at 668-74 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
158. Id. at 670-73 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
159. Id. at 674-79 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part). As a replacement for the Lemon test, in lieu of the endorsement test, Justice
Kennedy proposed a "coercion" test, according to which "[n]oncoercive government action
within the realm of flexible accommodation or passive acknowledgment of existing symbols
does not violate the Establishment Clause unless it benefits religion in a way more direct
and more substantial than practices that are accepted in our national heritage." Id. at 662
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). For arguments
favoring the coercion test over the endorsement test as a successor to the Lemon test, see
Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 WM. & MARY
L. RFV. 933, 940 (1986) (preferring the coercion test because the Lemon test "fails to
distinguish between efforts to coerce and influence religious belief and action, on the one
hand, and efforts to facilitate the exercise of one's chosen faith, on the other"); Patrick F.
Brown, Note, Wallace v. Jafree and the Need to Reform Establishment Clause Analysis,
35 CATH. U. L. Rav. 573, 575 (1986) (contending that the coercion test most accurately
reflects the historical impetus of the Establishment Clause, namely "fear of government
coercion," and is most likely to be applied with uniformity); Kristin J. Graham, Comment,
The Supreme Court Comes Full Circle: Coercion as the Touchstone of an Establishment
Clause Violation, 42 BUFFALO L. REV. 147, 148-50 (1994) (noting that the coercion test
predates the Lemon test and predicting its readoption, which would result in the Court
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In both School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball"6 and Aguilar
v.'Felton,'6 ' decided on the same day, a common five-member
majority employed the Lemon test to strike down legislation providing
public funding of remedial and enrichment classes for nonpublic
school students on the premises of nonpublic schools; however,
dissatisfaction with the Lemon test resurfaced among the dissenters. 62 Noting that the Court had utilized the Lemon test "in
every case involving the sensitive relationship between government
and religion in the education of our children," the Ball majority
pointedly reaffirmed the validity of the test in such cases.'o The
Ball Court found that the programs it examined failed the effect
prong of the Lemon test by impermissibly advancing religion in three
ways: The teachers potentially could propagate religious beliefs
because of the absence of a monitoring process; 64 the programs
themselves created a "symbolic link between government and
religion" by utilizing nonpublic school classrooms; 6 5 and because
the public funding relieved sectarian schools of much of the cost of

affirming more efforts to accommodate, sustaining more funding for religion-sponsored
social programs, and allowing more incidental support of religion in governmental actions).
Some commentators have proposed harmonizing or combining the endorsement and
coercion tests. See Andrew Rotstein, Good Faith? Religious-SecularParallelismand the
Establishment Clause, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 1763, 1805 (1993) (seeking to harmonize
coercion and endorsement by asserting that there is no state endorsement of religion
"[w]here governmental use of religious language or symbols merely recognizes the support
of religious traditions for consensual secular values"); E. Gregory Wallace, When
GovernmentSpeaks Religiously, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1183, 1270 (1994) (reasoning that
government must respect dual prohibitions of coercion and "orthodoxy"-meaning
endorsement--so that the inquiry becomes first whether religious speech by government
is coercive, and second whether it conveys a message of orthodoxy; if not, its scope must
be determined by "the political process and mutual forbearance").
160. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
161." 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
162. This dissatisfaction occurred primarily in the more comprehensive Aguilardissents.
See infra notes 171-77 and accompanying text.
163. Ball, 473 U.S. at 383.
164. Id. at 385-89.
165. Id. at 389-92. The Ball Court's only use of endorsement language appeared in its
explanation that the creation of a "symbolic link between government and religion"
offends the effect prong of Lemon when it "is sufficiently likely to be perceived by
adherents of the controlling denomination as an endorsement, and by the nonadherents
as a disapproval, of their individual religious choices." Id at 390. The Ball Court
suggested that had the programs under review been conducted off the nonpublic school
premises, they would have been upheld. Id. at 390-91 (citing Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S.
306 (1952)). In his dissent Justice Rehnquist wondered how the programs at issue in Ball
could signify "a greater 'symbolic link' "than the municipal creche permitted by Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984), or the legislative chaplain upheld in Marsh v. Chambers,
463 U.S. 783 (1983). Ball, 473 U.S. at 401 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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offering secular courses, such funding directly promoted religion by
subsidizing these schools' religious mission.'"
The entanglement prong of the Lemon test was not addressed in
Ball, but it proved decisive in Aguilar.67 In Aguilar the Court
found that the state's system for monitoring the content of publicly
funded classes in nonpublic schools to ensure religious neutrality met
the key concern of the effect prong because the state supervision
helped to prevent the program from serving to advance religion)6
Nonetheless, this system failed the third prong of the Lemon test
because such monitoring "inevitably results in an excessive entanglement of church and state, an Establishment Clause concern
distinct from that addressed by the effects doctrine.' ' 169 The Court
reasoned that the state's efforts to ensure religious neutrality by a
strategy of comprehensive surveillance necessitated a constant and
complex relationship between state officials and religious schools in
violation of the principle of governmental neutrality toward
religion.'
Noting this problematic relationship between the effect and
entanglement prongs of the Lemon test in Aguilar, Justice Powell
admitted that the Court's application of the test "require[d]
governments extending aid to parochial schools to tread an extremely
narrow line."''

In his dissent, Chief Justice Burger declared that

"the Court's obsession with the criteria identified in Lemon v.
Kurtzman ... has led to results that are 'contrary to the long-range
interests of the country.' ,,72 In Chief Justice Burger's view, the

programs at issue simply helped educate disadvantaged children and
posed no threat of establishing religion; he concluded that by striking
them down, the Court, instead of showing neutrality, demonstrated
"hostility toward religion and the children who attend churchsponsored schools."' 7 3

Justice Rehnquist likewise attacked the

Aguilar majority's application of the effect and entanglement prongs
of the Lemon test, condemning it as a" 'Catch-22' paradox" because
the Court found excessive entanglement in the supervision that the

166. Ball, 473 U.S. at 385, 392-97.
167. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 409-14 (1985).
168. ld. at 409.

169. Id.
170. Id. at 414 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 676 (1970)).
171. Id. at 418 (Powell, J., concurring).
172. Id. at 419 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373,400
(1985) (White, J., dissenting)).
173. Id. at 420 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
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state intended to guard against entanglement. 4 Justice O'Connor,
the last Aguilar dissenter, found the majority's application of the
Lemon test flawed by virtue of the fact that the test "condemns
benign cooperation between church and state."'7 5 She specifically

questioned the continued usefulness of the entanglement prong.' 76
Justice O'Connor asserted what she considered to be a more coherent
test: A statute which meets the purpose and effect tests of Lemon
should not be struck down solely because its administration entails
some continuing church-state cooperation to protect against impermissible advancement of religion.1"
Finally, in Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District,178 a
Court divided five-to-four upheld a public school district's provision
of a sign-language interpreter to accompany a deaf student to his
sectarian school. 179 The Court invoked a "breadth of coverage" test

by which it had "consistently held that government programs that
neutrally provide benefits to a broad class of citizens defined without
reference to religion are not readily subject to an Establishment
Clause challenge just because sectarian institutions may also receive
an attenuated benefit. ' ' "W The Court found that although the
programs it had previously disallowed involved direct aid in the form
of teachers, teaching materials, and equipment which the sectarian

174. Id. at 420-21 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Lines, supra note 113, at 16
(criticizing the contradictory outcomes that "Ball failed for lack of monitoring; Aguilar
failed for too much monitoring"). But cf Braveman, supra note 106, at 379 (arguing that
in both Aguilarand Ball the Court properly "reaffirmed the need for scrupulous neutrality
by government in religious matters").
175. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 421 (O'Connor, 3., dissenting).
176. Id at 422 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor charged that "[t]o a great
extent, the anomalous results in our Establishment Clause cases are 'attributable to [the]
entanglement prong.' " Id at 430 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Choper, supra note
104, at 681). Illustrative of this point for Justice O'Connor is the inconsistency of the
Court's decision to uphold public funding for bus transportation to a nonpublic school, id.
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17 (1947)), but
to strike down public funding of bus transportation for nonpublic school field trips because
of alleged excessive entanglement resulting from state supervision of the nonpublic school
teachers directing the field trips, id. (O'Connor, 3., dissenting) (citing Wolman v. Walter,
433 U.S. 229, 254 (1977).
177. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
178. 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993).
179. Id. at 2464-65. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority, which included
Justices White, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. Id. at 2463.
180. Id. at 2466 (citing Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S.
481 (1986); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983)).
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schools otherwise would have been required to fund themselves,' 8'

the Zobrest program provided aid directly to a handicapped student,
and otherwise would not have been funded by his school.'8
One commentator has posited that Zobrestsignalled "a new trend
in regard to public aid to religious schools under which the Court will
look to the facts of prior cases rather than applying the Lemon test
anew," and predicted that the Court's continued use of this approach
will lead to more "accommodationist results" and add "more
uncertainty to the law."'"
The Kiryas Joel Court did, in fact,
continue the trend of eschewing Lemon, at least in its traditional
application, in favor of case-by-case analysis; arguably the Kiryas Joel
holding also added uncertainty to the law. For instance, five members
of the Kiryas Joel Court indicated support for overturning two of the

Court's recent decisions."8 However, Kiryas Joel did not yield an
accommodationist result, though it hinted at the prospect of accommodations to come if the five Justices who expressed their willingness
to overturn Aguilar and Ball act accordingly.
Consistent with earlier cases, the Kiryas Joel Court applied to the

statute at issue the twin principles of neutrality and accommodation.
Following its recent trend, the Court did so not by formally employing
the Lemon test, but by comparing the Kiryas Joel statute with a law
struck down by the Court in Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc."8 as

violative of those principles.'86 Still, the Lemon principles, refined
and renamed, continued to function prominently in the Court's

181. Id. at 2468-69 (citing Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); School Dist. v. Ball
473 U.S. 373 (1985)); see also supra notes 160-66 and accompanying text.
182. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2468-69. Unconvinced by the majority's effort to distinguish
a teacher from an interpreter, Justice Blackmun in his dissent argued that the Court's
holding "has authorized a public employee to participate directly in religious indoctrination" because the Zobrest interpreter must necessarily convey the subject matter
of the deaf student's religion classes. Id. at 2469,2471-72 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The
majority's holding, Blackmun concluded, contradicted the Court's consistent proscription
of public provisions to sectarian schools "that afford even 'the opportunity for the
transmission of sectarian views.' " 1d. at 2473 (Blackmun, 1, dissenting) (quoting Wolman
v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 244 (1977)). Justice Blackmun found the provision of an
interpreter for religion classes to be analogous to the provision of equipment such as tape
recorders that the Court has deemed impermissible. Ild. at 2474 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
183. T. Jonathan Adams, Note, InterpretingState Aid to Religious Schools Under the

EstablishmentClause: Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District, 72 N.C. L. REv. 1039,
1058-59 (1994).
184. See infra notes 256-62 and accompanying text.
185. 459 U.S. 116 (1982); see also supra notes 129-36 and accompanying text.
186. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2487.
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analysis. Indeed, Larkin, heavily cited by a plurality"s and relied
upon by a majority,"s was itself decided under the Lemon test.189
Because of the anomalous nature of the Kiryas Joel statute, however,
the Larkin analogy was rejected absolutely by the dissenters,19 and
was avoided even by two members of the majority,'91 resulting in a

judgment defended by sharply differing rationales. While the Court
held that Chapter 748 exceeded the degree of accommodation allowed
by the benevolent neutrality ideal,"9 the dissent argued persuasively
to the contrary.193 Interestingly, the members of the majority, in
their diverse opinions, seemed dismayed that their decision left unmet
the educational needs of the handicapped children of the Village of
Kiryas Joel. In fact, these Justices proposed some intriguing solutions,
ranging from Justice O'Connor's prescription of modifications to the
Kiryas Joel statute,194 to a recommendation endorsed by five Justices
that the Court reverse its holdings in School Districtof Grand Rapids
v. Ball"5 and Aguilar v. Felton,'96 the decisions that prompted the

enactment of Chapter 748.1'
The Court's application of the principles of neutrality and
accommodation in Kiryas Joel is reflected in the two prongs of its
holding: First, Chapter 748 is an impermissible accommodation
because of its "allocation of political power on a religious criterion";
and second, the statute violates neutrality because it "neither
presupposes nor requires governmental impartiality toward
religion."' 98 Writing for a plurality, Justice Souter found that
Chapter 748 violated the neutrality principle specifically by
"delegating the State's discretionary authority over public schools to

187. Id. at 2487-90 (plurality opinion); see also infra notes 202-08 and accompanying
text.
188. Id. at 2491-93; see also infra notes 202-12 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 129-36 and accompanying text.
190. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2507-14 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also infra notes 221-30
and accompanying text.
191. For Justice O'Connor, the case most relevant to KiryasJoel was Larson v. Valente,
456 U.S. 228 (1982). Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2498 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment); see also supra notes 231-33 and accompanying text. Justice
Kennedy reached the judgment on an alternative rationale. Id. at 2500-01; see also supra
notes 234-39 and accompanying text.
192. See infra notes 240-43 and accompanying text.
193. See infra notes 244-47 and accompanying text.
194. See infra notes 263-69 and accompanying text.
195. 473 U.S. 373 (1985); see also supra notes 160-66 and accompanying text.
196. 473 U.S. 402 (1985); see also supra notes 167-77 and accompanying text.
197. See infra notes 256-62 and accompanying text.
198. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2484.
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a group defined by its character as a religious community, in a legal
and historical context that gives no assurance that governmental
power has been or will be exercised netitrally."'
Writing for a
majority, Justice Souter found that Chapter 748 also offended the
accommodation principle, specifically because "we have never hinted
that an otherwise unconstitutional delegation of political power to a
religious group could be saved as a religious accommodation." '
Therefore, the Court held that Chapter 748 did not qualify as an
exercise of benevolent neutrality whereby "the Constitution allows the
state to accommodate religious needs by alleviating special bur20
dens. '
In articulating a rationale throughout the plurality and majority
opinions, Justice Souter did not rely on traditional Lemon analysis;
instead, he undertook a case-specific comparative evaluation,
considering the statute overturned by the Court in Larkin as an
"instructive comparison" for determining the constitutionality of
Chapter 748.2° Justice Souter admitted that the analogy between
the Larkin law and Chapter 748 was not perfect because Chapter 748
delegated civic power to the voting citizens of Kiryas Joel rather than
to the leaders of a religious group or organization as did the Larkin
statute.0 3 Yet he dismissed this distinction as constitutionally
insignificant because the legal and historical "context" in which
Chapter 748 was enacted demonstrated that it "effectively identifies
these recipients of governmental authority by reference to doctrinal
adherence, even though it does not do so expressly."2 °4 Furthermore, Justice Souter stressed that, like the Larkin law, Chapter 748
was flawed by the "absence of an 'effective means of guaranteeing'
that governmental power will be and has been neutrally employed."'
Justice Blackmun correctly noted in his concurrence that, despite
the Court's avoidance of a Lemon analysis format and Lemon test
terminology, the Kiryas Joel decision utilized Lemon principles,
refined and renamed to fit the circumstances of the case.2° Illustrative of this fact is the effect of Justice Souter's reliance upon

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Id. at 2487 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 2493.
hM at 2492.
Id. at 2487 (plurality opinion); see also supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
Id. (plurality opinion).
Id. at 2489 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 2491 (quoting Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 125 (1982)).
Id. at 2494-95 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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Larkin, itself a textbook example of Lemon analysis. Applying the
Lemon test, the Larkin Court first reasoned that while the statute had
in view valid secular purposes, these could have been realized by
other means, such as a state-imposed total ban on alcohol sales within
reasonable distances of churches, schools, and similarly sensitive
institutions.
Likewise, the Kiryas Joel Court proposed several
religiously neutral means by which the state could have realized a
legitimate secular purpose of Chapter 748.2 Second, the Larkin
Court determined that the statute violated the primary effect test
because it "does not by its terms require that churches' power be used
in a religiously neutral way."" ° Similarly, in Kiryas Joel the Court
complained that Chapter 748 gave no assurance that "governmental
2 10
power will be and has been neutrally employed" by religion.
Third, the Larkin Court found that the statute violated the entanglement prong of the Lemon test because by "vesting significant
governmental authority in churches" it effected a " 'fusion of
governmental and religious functions' " prohibited by the Establishment Clause.2 ' Borrowing this Larkin language, the Kiryas Joel
Court found that Chapter 748 also resulted in "a purposeful and
forbidden 'fusion of governmental and religious functions.' ,212
Justice O'Connor and Justice Scalia presented differing assessments of the conspicuous absence of formal Lemon analysis in
Kiryas Joel. Justice O'Connor justified the Kiryas Joel Court's
approach, contending that the use of alternative terminology for the
Lemon principles has allowed the Court to develop more precise,
case-specific tests.213 Justice Scalia lamented the fact that the Court,
while snubbing Lemon, refrained once again from explicitly and
finally laying it to rest.214 Noting that in Kiryas Joel the lower
courts in their holdings and both parties in their briefs presumed the
precedential authority of the Lemon test, Justice Scalia argued that

207. Larkin, 459 U.S. at 123-24.

208. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2493; see also supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
209. Larkin, 459 U.S. at 125.
210. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2491.
211. Larkin, 459 U.S. at 126 (quoting School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963), and citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674-75 (1970);
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-13 (1947)).
212. KiryasJoel, 114 S. Ct. at 2490 (plurality opinion) (quoting Larkin, 459 U.S. at 126).
213. Id. at 2499-500 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
214. Id. at 2515 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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until the Court formally rejects Lemon, it will continue "to mislead
'
lower courts and parties about the relevance of the Lemon test."215
Though the Kiryas Joel majority acknowledged that Chapter 748
was an "unusual act," 16 Justice Souter insisted that "it resembles
the issue raised in Larkin to the extent that the earlier case teaches
that a State may not delegate its civic authority to a group chosen by
a religious criterion.""
Thus, Justice Souter found that Chapter
748 was fatally flawed because "the State's manipulation of the
franchise for this district limited it to Satmars, giving the sect
exclusive control of the political subdivision." '
Justice Souter
mustered arguments from the legal and historical context in which
Chapter 748 was enacted to support his charge of "manipulation," and
to explain the significant fact that the statute does not expressly name
its beneficiaries as a religious group.2
By this reasoning, Justice
Souter rejected the alternative view of this unusual act-that it is
distinguishable from the Larkin law because it represented "a
delegation on principles neutral to religion, to individuals whose
religious ' identities
are incidental to their receipt of civic
20
authority. )
The position that Chapter 748 is distinguishable from the Larkin
law may be appropriate on the facts of Kiryas Joel. As Justice Scalia
noted in his dissent, unlike the Larkin case, in which the government
allowed certain religious organizations to wield discretionary political
powers, the statute at issue in Kiryas Joel did not intend to single out
the Satmars as a religious group to receive any analogous benefits.'
First, unlike the Larkin law, Chapter 748 sought to provide the
benefits of a welfare program for the general public to citizens who
happened to share a common religious identity.'
In this respect,
Chapter 748 is analogous to the statute authorizing reimbursement of
public bus fares to the parents of private school students, all of whom
happened to be Catholic, which the Court upheld in Everson v. Board

215. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia's complaint, however, rings hollow when
coupled with his critique of Justice O'Connor's alternative "situation-specific rules" as an
effort "to replace Lemon with nothing." See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
216. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2484.

217. Id. at 2488 (plurality opinion).
218.
219.
text.
220.
221.
222.

Id& (plurality opinion).
Id. at 2489-90 (plurality opinion); see also supra notes 51-53 and accompanying
Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2489 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 2510 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2506 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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of Education.' The Everson Court held that in the case of public
welfare programs for students, such as the provision of public
transportation-or, arguably, as in Kiryas Joel, special education for
handicapped students-the Free Exercise Clause prohibits the state4
from excluding anyone "because of their faith, or lack of it."'
Therefore, Chapter 748 should not have been struck down simply
because it provided public welfare benefits to citizens of a common
religious identity. Second, unlike the statute in Larkin, Chapter 748
was respectful of neutrality. Contrary to the majority's interpretation
of the governmental action in Kiryas Joel, the state arguably did not
draw the school district's political boundaries intentionally on the
basis of religion; rather, it adopted the village's preexisting political
m '
boundaries.
As Justice Scalia noted, these preexisting village
boundaries were drawn for the political purpose of excluding those
who did not share the Satmars' preference for zoning that permitted
high density housing, not for the religious purpose 6of excluding those
who did not share the Satmars' religious identity.1
That Chapter 748 adopted preexisting political boundaries,
"drawn on the basis of communality of secular governmental
desires"''- 7 rather than religion, weakens Justice Souter's first
contextual argument that, as with the Larkin provision, the state in
Kiryas Joel must have intended Chapter 748 to single out the Satmars
for special favor because it passed the measure with full knowledge
that the village was exclusively Satmar.
Justice Souter's other
contextual arguments are less than compelling. Although establishing
a village school district may have marked a departure from the
statewide trend, and the use of a special legislative act may have been
an unusual way to set up such a district, 9 these facts do not require
a finding that the state intended Chapter 748 as anything other than
a religiously neutral accommodation of the unusual needs of the
Village of Kiryas Joel. If the state deemed its enactment of Chapter
748 a workable mechanism for delivering public welfare services to
citizens in need of them, the legislature's failure to choose among

223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

330 U.S. 1, 3-18 (1947).
Id. at 16.
Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2511 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2489-90 (plurality opinion).
Id. (plurality opinion).
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other options deemed available by Justice Souter was not an
indication of religious favoritism on the state's part. °
Like Justice Souter, Justice O'Connor found Chapter 748 to be
unconstitutional partly because it isolated a single religious sect for
special treatment; however, she recognized the unusual attendant
circumstances: "I realize this is a close question, because the Satmars
may be the only group who currently need this particular accommodation."'" Instead of Larkin, though, Justice O'Connor looked
to Larson v. Valente,.' 2 in which the Court used strict scrutiny equal
protection analysis to evaluate governmental action for religious
favoritism. 3 Justice O'Connor's choice of Larson as an analog is
subject to the same critique as Justice Souter's use of Larkin: Unlike
the statute af issue in Larkin, which clearly favored religion over
nonreligion, or the one in Larson, which clearly favored some
denominations over others, Chapter 748 was facially neutral. The
majority, therefore, had to rely on speculative contextual arguments
to support the contention that the Kiryas Joel statute intentionally
favored the Satmars so that it could be characterized as religious
gerrymandering.
Justice Kehnedy added to the Kiryas Joel majority's diversity of
rationales by declining to join in the Court's Larkin-based opinion,
choosing instead to decide the case by invoking the Establishment
Clause's prohibition of "explicit religious gerrymandering" and
analogizing from Equal Protection Clause analysis which bars
Justice Kennedy
government segregation by race or religion.'
acknowledged that the Village of Kiryas Joel was legitimately founded
"pursuant to a religion-neutral self-incorporation scheme," but the
logic of his reasoning was strained by his conclusion that by conforming the school district to the preexisting village boundaries the state
"had a direct hand in accomplishing the religious segregation which
More reasonable is the conclusion that
characterizes the district."'
the government was not guilty of segregating on a religious basis
when it simply recognized and made practical use of the political
boundaries that were formed when the Satmars legitimately incorporated the Village of Kiryas Joel with the resultant self-segregation
230. Id. (plurality opinion).
231. Id. at 2497-98 (O'Connor, 3., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
232. 456 U.S. 228 (1982); see also supra notes 122-28 and accompanying text.
233. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2498 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
234. Id. at 2504 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
235. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
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of their religious sect. Surely Chapter 748 did not present the danger
of "stigma and stirred animosities" characteristic of the governmental
segregation against which the Equal Protection Clause was intended
to protect. 6 Nor is it clear that Chapter 748 constituted religious

gerrymandering. As Justice Scalia noted,' the Court previously
had held that to prove religious gerrymandering a claimant "must be
able to show the absence of a neutral secular basis for the lines
government has drawn.""8 The preexisting village boundaries
arguably constituted such a neutral secular basis for the lines drawn
by Chapter 748 to establish the school district for the Village of
Kiryas Joel, because the village boundaries were established pursuant
to a neutral, generally applicable state law, not through a special act
of religious accommodation. 39
The Kiryas Joel Court's determination that Chapter 748 exceeded
the degree of accommodation allowed by the benevolent neutrality
ideal was based on two contentions: first, that an "unconstitutional
delegation of political power to a religious group" cannot be deemed
a permissible accommodation of religion;2 and second, that the
measure lacked the requisite means of insuring neutrality in its
application. 24' The first contention begs the question whether
Chapter 748 in fact delegated political power to a religious group.2 42
The second contention was grounded in the questionable presumption
that by creating the village school district through a case-specific act
of the legislature benefitting a single religious group, the state
preempted the process of judicial review that operates under a
236. Id.(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
237. Md at 2508 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
238. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2508 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Gillette v. United
States, 401 U.S. 437, 452 (1971)).
239. See supra notes 225-26 and accompanying text. Sharing Justice Scalia's view of
Kiryas Joel by depicting it as "a validly incorporated municipality comprised of individual
landowners most of whom happen to be adherents of the same religion," one commentator
argued that government aid to the village passed all three prongs of the Lemon test. Craig
L. Olivo, Note, Grumet v. Board of Education of the Kiryas Joel Village School
Dist.-When Neutrality Masks Hostility-The Exclusion of Religious Communities From
an Entitlement to Public Schools, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 775, 800 n.136 (1993). Olivo
contrasted the Village of Kiryas Joel with the City of Rajneeshpuram in Oregon, whose
incorporation was struck down as having the primary effect of advancing religion because
its boundaries were coterminous with those of a religious commune in which all property
was owned and controlled by a for-profit corporation founded expressly to advance the
faith of the sect. Id. (citing Oregon v. City of Rajneeshpuram, 598 F. Supp. 1208, 1216-17
(D. Or. 1984)).
240. Kiryas Joel, 114 S.Ct. at 2493.
241. Id.at 2491.
242. See supra notes 221-26 and accompanying text.
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generally applicable law. From this presumption, the Court concluded
that the state could not ensure neutrality because, in the event that
the state should subsequently deny to a similarly situated group the
benefits conferred upon the Satmars by Chapter 748, a court
challenge based on equal protection would be unavailable.243
Justice Kennedy and Justice Scalia forcefully contended that the
Court's insistence upon guarantees of neutrality lacked backing in
legal precedent and ignored the unusual nature of the facts of Kiryas
Joel. Justice Kennedy asserted that the Kiryas Joel Court's position
that an accommodation for a particular religious group is
invalid because of the risk that the legislature will not grant
the same accommodation to another religious group suffering some similar burden.., seems to me without grounding in our precedents and a needless restriction upon the
legislature's ability to respond to the unique problems of a
particular religious group.2

Furthermore, Justice Kennedy argued that the rationale for the
Court's conclusion that the creation of the district favors the Satmars
was flawed because it failed to presume the constitutionality of the
statute and it prejudged the New York legislature.245 Moreover,
Justice Kennedy charged that it was incorrect for the majority to
assume that no court challenge would be available in the event the
state denied accommodation to another group facing a similar
burden.2' On the same grounds, Justice Scalia sharply protested
the Court's unreasonable demand for "up front" assurances of
neutrality, declaring with indignation and, seemingly, with some
justification:
It is presumptuous for this Court to impose-out of
nowhere-an unheard-of prohibition against proceeding in
this manner [case by case, as do the courts] upon the
Legislature of New York State. I never heard of such a
principle, nor has anyone else, nor will it ever be heard of

243. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2491; see also id. at 2497-98 (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).
244. Id. at 2500-01 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
245. Id. at 2503 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
246. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Kennedy argued that if the
state failed to accommodate a similarly situated religious community, that community
could sue on the ground that such discriminatory treatment offended the Establishment
Clause, requiring the court to decide only "whether the community does indeed bear the
same burden on its religious practice as did the Satmars in Kiryas Joel." Id. (Kennedy,
J., concurring in the judgment) (citing Olsen v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 878 F.2d 1458,
1463-65 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
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again. Unlike what the New York legislature has done, this
is a special rule to govern only the Satmar Hasidim.247
The fact that the Justices proposed an array of alternative
constitutionally permissible strategies for meeting the educational
needs of the handicapped Satmar children created the impression that
the Court was almost apologetic for striking down Chapter 748.
Justice Souter and the majority encouraged the state to solicit "an
educationally appropriate offering by Monroe-Woodbury," the
neighboring district-such as "a separate program of bilingual and
bicultural education at a neutral site near one of the village's
parochial schools"-to be "administered in accordance with neutral
principles that would not necessarily confine special treatment to
Satmars." 48 However, this suggestion sounds like a modified
version of the pre-Chapter 748 program, housed in an annex to a
Satmar school, that was terminated by Monroe-Woodbury in response
to the School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball49 and Aguilar v.
Felton"0 decisions."' Furthermore, as Justice Souter intimated,
the Monroe-Woodbury district was not likely to undertake the
expense of a free-standing program such as this without state pressure
or incentives.' 2
Justices Stevens, Blackmun, and Ginsburg recommended that the
state implement programs "promoting diversity and understanding in
the public schools" to help the neighboring district assimilate the
Satmar children 3 This idea appears somewhat insensitive to the
Satmars' religious and cultural commitments to self-segregation,
especially when considered in connection with these Justices'
allegation that through Chapter 748 the state improperly advanced
religion by segregating the Satmar children so as to increase the
likelihood that they would remain adherents of their parents'
religion. 4 As long ago as Everson v. Board of Education.2" the

247. Id. at 2514 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
248. Id. at 2493 (citing Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 247-48 (1977)).
249. 473 U.S. 373 (1985); see also supra notes 160-66 and accompanying text.
250. 473 U.S. 402 (1985); see also supra notes 167-77 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
252. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2493. Justice Souter advised that "if the New York
legislature should remain dissatisfied with the responsiveness of the local school district,
it could certainly enact general legislation tightening the mandate to school districts on
matters of special education or bilingual and bicultural offerings." Id.
253. Id. at 2495 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
254. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
255. 330 U.S. 1, 3 (1947) (regarding funding for public transportation); see also supra
notes 105-10 and accompanying text.
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Court upheld state benefits for parochial school students even though
one effect of that aid was to make it easier for parents to keep their
children in religious schools, thereby enhancing the prospect that
those children would remain faithful to their parents' religion.
Five members of the Kiryas Joel Court-Justice O'Connor, 6
Justice Kennedy, 7 and the three dissenters, Justice Scalia, Chief
Justice Rehnquist, and Justice Thomas 8 -called for reconsideration
of School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball2 9 and Aguilar v. Felton,260 the decisions that set the stage for the enactment of Chapter
748 by striking down state provision of public educational services on
the premises of religious schools. Justice O'Connor expressed the
sentiments of these Justices when she asserted that one acceptable
accommodation of the Satmars would be a return to the pre-Aguilar
scheme.2 61 She reasoned that "[i]t is the Court's insistence on
disfavoring religion in Aguilar that led New York to favor it here"
and concluded that "[i]f the government provides this education onsite at public schools and at nonsectarian private schools, it is only fair
that it provide it on-site at sectarian schools as wel." '262

Such

reformist intentions regarding Aguilar and Ball notwithstanding, the
prospect that the Court will revisit these holdings at an undetermined
future date does little to resolve the immediate problem of providing
needed public educational services to the Village of Kiryas Joel.
Much more promising is the other solution proposed by Justice
O'Connor: the enactment of a new statute that meets the Court's
requirements for benevolent neutrality.263 Justice O'Connor counseled that the state could properly accommodate the Satmars by
enacting "generally applicable legislation" that would either permit all
villages to operate school districts, or establish neutral criteria, to be
applied by a state agency whose decisions are subject to. judicial
review, and permit only those villages that meet these criteria to
operate school districts. 2 4 Insisting that "[o]ur invalidation of
256. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2498 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment). Of these companion cases, Justice O'Connor specifically named only
Aguilar. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
257. Id. at 2505 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
258. Id at 2514-15 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
259. 473 U.S. 373 (1985); see also supra notes 160-66 and accompanying text.
260. 473 U.S. 402 (1985); see also supra notes 167-77 and accompanying text.
261. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2498 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
262. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
263. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
264. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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[Chapter 748] in no way means that the Satmars' needs cannot be
accommodated," Justice O'Connor concluded that a school district
established according to the model legislation she outlined would be
upheld under the Kiryas Joel decision "even though it coincides with
a village which was consciously created by its voters as an enclave for
their religious group."2 " Taking Justice O'Connor at her word, just
days after the Court delivered its opinion in Kiryas Joel, the New
York legislature enacted a statute purporting to conform to Justice
O'Connor's proposed model.'
Validated by this new law, the
Village of Kiryas Joel school district remains in operation. 267
However, shortly after the measure was passed, opponents of Chapter
748 renewed litigation, challenging the constitutionality of the revised
statute.m Thus, Justice O'Connor's "solution" will not finally solve
the problem of providing public special education to the handicapped
children of the Village of Kiryas Joel until and unless the judiciary
269
endorses the state's new statute in "Kiryas Joel 11."
Only Justice Scalia's proposal could have effected an immediate
solution for the village and the Satmar children: The Court simply
should have upheld Chapter 748 as "an admirably American
accommodation" of religion" The Justices' various arguments for
and against the constitutionality of Chapter 748 seem to stem in great
part from differing assessments of the New York legislature's
intention in passing the statute. At the core of the differing assessments is the anomaly of a specially created school district with
boundaries that conform to those of a village whose residents are
exclusively members of a single religious sect. The majority seemed
to view these circumstances with a skepticism that extended to its
assessment of the state's purpose. To the majority, protective of the

265. Id.(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
266. Gary Spencer, Judge Declines to Bar School DistrictLaw; New Kiryas Joel Statute
Called Constitutional,N.Y. L.J.,Aug. 11, 1994, at 1. The measure permits any municipality
to form a school district if it meets requisite population, enrollment, and wealth criteria.
N.Y. Educ. Law § 1504.3.a (McKinney 1995); see also Spencer, supra, at 1.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. The Kiryas Joel school district survived the first skirmish in the renewed litigation,
on August 9, 1994, when Albany County Supreme Court Justice Joseph Harris refused to
enjoin continued operation of the district, upholding the constitutionality of the newly
enacted statute and portraying it as "essentially a peace treaty with the Establishment
Clause." Grumet v. Cuomo, No. 4210-94, 1994 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 448, at *29 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Aug. 9, 1994).
270. Kiryas Joel, 114 S.Ct. at 2506 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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principle of neutrality, it all smacked of religious favoritism."
However, because the majority had no direct evidence of such
favoritism, it had to support its assessment with conjecture from
context. 272
On the other hand, the dissent, more eager to act on the
accommodation principle, accepted at face value the creation of the
exclusively Satmar village and the resultant Satmar-only school
district. The dissent reasoned that the state laws establishing the
school district and founding the village were facially neutral, and these
laws made no express reference to the beneficiaries as members of a
discrete religious sect 73 This analysis effectively exposed the
speculative nature of the majority's allegation of religious favoritism
in Chapter 748 and made a strong case for its constitutionality as a
permissible accommodation.
Nevertheless, the Kiryas Joel Court found that Chapter 748 fell
short of the Court's conception of the elusive ideal of benevolent
neutrality.274 Perhaps the model statute prescribed by Justice
O'Connor in Kiryas Joel embodies that ideal. However, did Chapter
748 fall so short of the benevolent neutrality ideal as to be violative
of religious neutrality? Or did the ideal elude the New York legislature when it enacted Chapter 748 because the Court requires too
much? Considering the acknowledged anomaly of the Kiryas Joel
facts-facts that presented a case of first impression to the legislature-the state's course of action in drafting Chapter 748 to provide
for the only religious group apparently in need of such an accommodation could hardly be considered unreasonable.
Under these circumstances, Justice Souter's expressed concern
over the absence of any track record by which the state could
demonstrate its good-faith intent to provide similar benefits to other
groups seems unrealistic. 5 Justice Scalia seized upon this unfairness and responded sarcastically that had the state, prior to Kiryas
Joel, actually established such school districts for other religious
groups, "each of them would have been attacked (and invalidated) for
the same reason as this one: because it had no antecedents. The
Court certainly has in mind some way around this chicken-and-egg
problem. Perhaps the legislature could name the first four districts in

271.
272.
273.
274.
275.

I. at 2491-92.
Id. at 2491.
Id. at 2510-11 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2492.
Id. at 2491.
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pectore. 27 6 Now, with direction from a Court guided by hindsight
unavailable to the state legislature that adopted Chapter 748, the state
has cured this statute of constitutional problems, assuming that the
measure holds up under the scrutiny of the ongoing litigation.2'
After all, Justice O'Connor's prescription was only dictum. 78
It is indeed noteworthy that five members of the Kiryas Joel
Court decided that, in its quest for the elusive ideal of benevolent
neutrality, the Court in Aguilar and Ball required too much. It also
is arguable that the Kiryas Joel Court required too much of Chapter
748. If the successor to Chapter 748, modeled after Justice
O'Connor's proposal, is successfully defended, perhaps the ideal will
gain some clarity and be rendered somewhat less elusive. However,
unless and until that happens, Kiryas Joel may best be remembered
as a case in which the Court missed a good chance to affirm "an
admirably American accommodation" of religion.27 9
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276. Id. at 2513 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
277. See N.Y. Educ. Law § 1504.3.a (McKinney 1995); see also supra notes 266-69 and
accompanying text.
278. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2498 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment); see also supra notes 263-65 and accompanying text.
279. Id. at 2506 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

